I made the following post on WWP regarding financial irregularities in regging. I thought it might be of some interest here, and I wonder if anyone has similar knowledge or experience.
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The one I recall involved the cross-guarantee of personal loans between Public that was coordinated and encouraged by Reges and other staff. It went something like this:
Public A is solvent and has good credit.
Public B is solvent and has good credit.
Public A wants to take out a personal loan from Financial Institution No. 1 to pay for auditing. Public A would not be able to get the loan from Financial Institution No. 1 despite his good credit unless he has someone else who is solvent and has good credit guarantee the loan. So Public A has Public B guarantee the loan from Financial Institution No. 1 to Public A.
Now Public B wants to take out a personal loan from Financial Institution No. 2 to pay for the training. Public B would not be able to get the loan from Financial Institution No. 2 despite his good credit unless he has someone else who is solvent and has good credit guarantee the loan. So Public B has Public A guarantee the loan from Financial Institution No. 2 to Public B.
Perhaps the most important part of the procedure follows.
When Public A takes out the personal loan from Financial Institution No. 1 based on the guarantee of Public B, neither Public A nor Public B disclose to Financial Institution No. 1 that the next day Public A is going to guarantee the debt of Public B to Financial Institution No. 2.
When Public B takes out the personal loan from Financial Institution No. 2 based on the guarantee of Public A, neither Public B nor Public A disclose to Financial Institution No. 2 that the prior day Public B guaranteed the debt of Public A to Financial Institution No. 1.
It was possible that the above might be accomplished without technically and legally committing fraud because the COS reges and staff may have found a flaw in the system.
When Public A guaranteed the debt of Public B, the paper work asked about Public A's income, assets and debts, but it did not ask about: (1) past, present and anticipated future guarantees of the debts of another; or (2) more generally, contingent liabilities. Depending on how the guarantee was written, Public A's guarantee of the debt of Public B was not a "debt" of Public A unless and until Public B defaulted. Thus, the COS reg and staff argued that the prior, present or anticipated future guarantee did not have to be disclosed because it was not a "debt" -- yet.
Likewise, when Public B guaranteed the debt of Public A, the paper work asked about Public B's income, assets and debts, but it did not ask about: (1) past, present and anticipated future guarantees of the debts of another; or (2) more generally, contingent liabilities. Again, depending on how the guarantee was written, Public B's guarantee of the debt of Public A was not a "debt" of Public B unless and until Public A defaulted. Thus, the COS reg and staff argued that the prior, present or anticipated future guarantee did not have to be disclosed because it was not a "debt" -- yet.
Now, take the above scheme and expand it to 3, 4, 5, etc., parties, with everyone cross-guaranteeing each other's debts. The expansion was factorial. That is, Public A guarantees the debuts of Publics, B, C and D. Public B guarantees the debts of Publics A, C, and D. Etc.
Also, once you have more than two parties you can have more than one guarantor for each debt. That is, Publics A and B guarantee the debt of Public C. Publics B and C guarantee the debt of Public A. You know, in order to give each financial institution peace of mind.
Of course, once Public A, B, or C, etc., defaults, and the relevant Financial Institution calls on the guaranteeing Public to pay the debt, then the whole house of cards collapses.
The above practices were sold and justified to the public in the same way incurring debt to pay for services was always sold and justified to the public. The justification was that the Training or Auditing would make you so much more able, and so much more able to earn more money, that you would not only easily pay off the debt (or not be called on to pay the pay the guarantee, or be able to pay the guarantee), so that the additional debt or contingent liability was of no concern.
You know, just like taking on debt to pay for medical school is not a disqualifying concern because of the income you will make after you become a licensed physician. Obviously, the same thing will be true when you become a certified Class IV Auditor, or you business booms as a result of your becoming a trained Auditor and/or learning LRH Admin tech.
Now, the beauty of the above from the COS perspective is that neither the COS nor the Reg is a debtor, guarantor, obligor, or signatory on any note, guarantee, loan application or other piece of paper. The COS and the Reg are invisible to the involved Financial Institutions. IF (and that is a big IF) one of the Publics spilled the beans, then a good attorney could sue the Reg and perhaps the COS on a conspiracy theory, but that would be unlikely, difficult and very hard to prove. The COS would have a large degree of plausible deniability. If necessary, the COS would throw the Reg under the bus. And probably do so citing a convenient LRH policy against engaging in financial irregularities.
I recall one Sea Org member who was allegedly notorious for this. He would allegedly engage in such, or similar, questionable practices, bring in a lot of money, and be a hero. Until things blew up and there was a scandal, at which point he was thrown under the bus, busted, RPFed, and eventually transferred to another Org. At which point, you guessed it, he began to engage in such, or similar, questionable practices, brought in a lot of money, and became a hero....



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